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July 1, 2002 
The American war on terrorism since the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon has presented Beijing with a dilemma. On one hand, Washington's call for international support 
in the war on terrorism gave Beijing an opportunity to improve bilateral relations with a new Bush 
Administration that previously had regarded ties with the PRC with a cool skepticism. On the other hand, 
Washington's conduct of the war on terrorism has given it new strategic assets and military relationships 
in Asia that, Beijing fears, may be used in the long term to contain China itself. With diverging key 
interests at stake, Beijing's view of the war on terrorism has been publicly collaborative but also 
increasingly ambivalent. 
U.S.-China Bilateral Relations 
For Beijing, a stable relationship with the United States is critical to China's economic development. Since 
the early 1980s, the PRC has relied heavily on access to U.S. markets and on American investment to 
fuel its drive at economic modernization. China's success at economic reform over the past two decades 
is due in part to the policy of economic engagement pursued by the past six U.S. administrations, from 
President Nixon to President Clinton. Campaign statements by President George W. Bush and some of 
his policy advisers, however, promised a harder policy line toward China. In addition, the EP-3 affair--in 
which a Chinese fighter collided with an American electronic surveillance plane off the China coast in 
April last year--introduced an early sour note into Beijing's relationship with the new administration. 
The attacks on 11 September therefore gave Beijing an opportunity to help Washington on an issue of top 
priority for the United States. Beijing seized the opportunity immediately. In telephone calls to President 
Bush by Chinese President Jiang Zemin immediately after the 11 September attacks and in 
conversations in Washington of the PRC foreign minister with the President, Vice President Cheney, and 
Secretary Powell soon thereafter, the Beijing leadership condemned the attacks and pledged cooperation 
in the following war against terrorism. In summits with the President in Shanghai in October and in Beijing 
in February this year, Jiang urged the creation of long-term mechanisms for combating international 
terrorism. 
Concretely, Beijing cooperated. It lent diplomatic support in persuading Pakistan--long a close Chinese 
ally and a key country in the American effort in Afghanistan--to cooperate with Washington. Beijing voted 
in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1368 authorizing the use of military force against al-Qaida and 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan--the first time Beijing has voted for the international use of force since 
taking its seat in 1971. It has supplied intelligence on financial networks and on fundamentalist Islamic 
groups operating in western China and having ties to al-Qaida. As the Afghan campaign began, it closed 
its border with Afghanistan to prevent al-Qaida and Taliban members from escaping into western China. 
For all these steps and others, President Bush has publicly thanked Beijing more than once. 
Administration officials also implied that Beijing's collaboration had moderated their earlier skeptical view 
of China, promising no longer to talk of China as a "strategic competitor." 
Strategic Unease 
At the same time, the course of the American war on terrorism has increasingly unsettled Chinese 
security and foreign affairs analysts, who see Washington using the war to enhance what they see as 
American predominance-"hegemonism"-in the international system. They also are suspicious that 
Washington is using the war on terrorism not only to root out al-Qaida and its supporters, but also to 
extend a decade-long effort to encircle China strategically. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Beijing has worried about the implications of the resulting 
"unipolar" world order-one in which the United States remains as the sole superpower, now able to 
dominate the international system and pursue unilateral policy courses unconstrained by counter-
balancing great powers. Since the early 1990s, therefore, Beijing has sought to dilute overarching 
American power globally in two ways. First, it has tried to play to a presumed interest of other significant 
centers of power in the international system-Russia, European states like Germany and France, India, 
and others-in limiting U.S. power. These efforts are usually couched in the rhetoric of promoting 
"multipolarity" in the international order and are manifested in the "strategic partnerships" Beijing has 
established with Moscow in 1997, Paris in the same year, Sao Paolo thereafter, and others. 
Second, Beijing has insisted that U.S. military intervention in regional crises proceed under the auspices 
of the United Nations, where Beijing as a permanent Security Council member may have a voice in 
shaping how such intervention is pursued. For example, Beijing went along with the U.S.-led effort in 
1991 to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait because Washington did proceed under the umbrella of UN Security 
Council authority. In contrast, Beijing objected vehemently to the U.S. intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In 
that instance Washington sidestepped the United Nations and proceeded under the umbrella of NATO, a 
"unilateralist" course that Beijing fears might plausibly be employed by Washington in a crisis over Taiwan, 
Tibet, or some other area of direct Chinese concern. In the present context, Beijing's support for war on 
terrorism in Afghanistan was made easier because Washington sought to work through the UN Security 
Council.  
In addition to these broad strategic concerns at the global level, Beijing has seen the war on terrorism as 
enhancing the American military position in Asia, directly on China's periphery. Specifically, the war on 
terrorism has: 
• Given the United States a new and potentially permanent military presence in Central Asia;  
• Extended Washington's tilt toward India in South Asia, resuming military cooperation between 
them;  
• Lent impetus to a restored U.S.-Philippines military relationship;  
• Provided the opportunity for resuming long-suspended U.S. military cooperation with Indonesia; 
and  
• Provided the occasion for support roles by the Japanese navy in the Indian Ocean, far beyond its 
previous scope of operations.  
These steps complement other steps by the United States since the early 1990s to enhance the 
American security posture in the Asia-Pacific region in ways that, in the eyes of many Chinese security 
analysts, portend a new American effort to "contain" China, as Washington had attempted in the 1950s. 
These steps include: 
• Expansion of the scope of the U.S.-Japan security alliance;  
• Expanded U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, together with incremental steps to upgrade Washington's 
quasi-official relationship with Taipei;  
• Normalization of American relations with Hanoi in 1995;  
• Efforts to build theater missile defense systems with Japan and possibly Taiwan;  
• Plans to build a national missile defense system that effectively negates China's small nuclear 
deterrent; and  
• The Bush Administration's announced plan to shift the focus of American defense forces from 
Europe to the Asia-Pacific region.  
Chinese security and foreign affairs analysts are not unanimous on the significance of these steps for 
American China policy, which they acknowledge has long been couched in the language of 
"engagement." For most of the past decade, a persisting and thinly concealed debate has festered in 
Beijing over exactly what Washington's policy toward China is. Some have argued that Washington's 
policy course has been essentially one of cooperative engagement, despite its steps in the security realm 
over the past several years. Others argue that Washington talks the talk of engagement, but it actually 
has been quietly practicing a policy of containment that ultimately seeks to break China's growing power 
and overturn the Beijing regime. 
The implication of all of these considerations on Beijing's part is that Beijing's approach to the American 
war on terrorism will be colored significantly by its perceptions of the longer term impact that the conduct 
of the war will have on American power globally and in the Asia-Pacific region specifically. Beijing will 
continue to support Washington in the limited ways that do not jeopardize what it sees as its own security 
interests in the region. At the same time, it will be eager to appear supportive of the war on terrorism 
because the economic relationship with the United States is so critical to China's present and future 
prosperity. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our East Asia Resources and 
Homeland Security & Terrorism Resources. 
 
